Abstract-Cloud service providers offer various facilities to their clients. The clients with limited resources opt for some of these facilities. They can outsource their bulk data to the cloud server. The cloud server maintains these data in lieu of monetary benefits. However, a malicious cloud server might delete some of these data to save some space and offer this extra amount of storage to another client. Therefore, the client might not retrieve her file (or some portions of it) as often as needed. Proofs of retrievability (POR) provide an assurance to the client that the server is actually storing all of her data appropriately and they can be retrieved at any point of time. In a dynamic POR scheme, the client can update her data after she uploads them to the cloud server. Moreover, in publicly verifiable POR schemes, the client can delegate her auditing task to some third party specialized for this purpose. In this work, we exploit the homomorphic hashing technique to design a publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme that is more efficient (in terms of bandwidth required between the client and the server) than the "state-of-the-art" publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme. We also analyze security and performance of our scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
I N the age of cloud computing, cloud servers with adequate resources help their clients by performing huge amount of computation or by storing large amount of data (say, in the order of terabytes) on their behalf. In this setting, a client only has to download the result of the computation or has to read (or update) the required portion of the outsourced data. Several storage service providers like Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive provide storage outsourcing facility to their clients (data owners). However, a cloud storage server can be malicious and delete some (less frequently accessed) part of the client's data in order to save space. Secure cloud storage protocols (two-party protocols between the client and the server) provide a cryptographic solution to this problem by ensuring that the client's data are stored untampered in the cloud server.
In a secure cloud storage scheme, a client can remotely check the integrity of her data file outsourced to the cloud server. A possible way to do this is to divide the data file into blocks and attach an authenticator (or tag) to each of these blocks before the initial outsourcing. When the client wants to check the integrity of her data, she downloads all the blocks of the file along with their tags from the server and verifies them individually. However, this process is highly inefficient due to the large communication bandwidth required between the client and the cloud server.
In order to resolve the issue mentioned above, a notion called proofs-of-storage comes into play where the client can audit her data file stored in the server without accessing the whole file, and still, be able to detect an unwanted modification of the file done by the malicious server. The concept of provable data possession (PDP) is introduced by Ateniese et al. [1] where the client computes an authentication tag for each block of her data file and uploads the file along with these authentication tags as stated earlier. Later, the client can execute an audit protocol and verify the integrity of the data file by checking only a predefined number of randomly sampled blocks of the file.
Although efficient PDP schemes [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] are available in the literature, they only provide the guarantee of retrievability of almost all blocks of the data file. We briefly mention some situations where this guarantee is not sufficient. The data file may contain some sensitive information (e.g., accounting information) any part of which the client does not want to lose. On the other hand, a corruption in the compression table of an outsourced compressed file might make the whole file unavailable. In a searchable symmetric encryption scheme [5] , the client encrypts a database using a symmetric encryption scheme to form an index (metadata for that database) [6] and outsources the encrypted documents along with the index to the server. The size of this index is very small compared to the encrypted database itself. However, loss of the index completely defeats the purpose of the searchable encryption scheme. In such circumstances, the client wants a stronger notion than PDP which would guarantee that the server has stored the entire file properly and the client can retrieve all of her data blocks at any point of time.
To address the issue mentioned above, Juels and Kaliski [7] introduce proofs of retrievability (POR) where the data file outsourced to the server can be retrieved in its entirety by the client. The underlying idea [8] of a POR scheme is to encode the original data file with an errorcorrecting code, authenticate the blocks of the encoded file with tags and upload them on the storage server. As in PDP schemes, the client can execute an audit protocol to check the integrity of the outsourced data file. The use of error-correcting codes ensures that all data blocks of the file are retrievable. Depending on the nature of the outsourced data, POR schemes are classified as: POR schemes for static data (static POR) and dynamic data (dynamic POR). For static data, the client cannot change her data after the initial outsourcing (suitable mostly for backup or archival data). Dynamic data are more generic in that the client can modify her data as often as needed. The POR schemes are publicly verifiable if audits can be performed by any third party auditor (TPA) with the knowledge of public parameters only; they are privately verifiable if only the client (data owner) with some secret information can perform audits.
Designing an efficient and publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme is an important research problem due to its practical applications. There are various efficiency parameters where the performance of a dynamic POR scheme might be improved. Some of them include the communication bandwidth required to read or write a data block (or to perform an audit), the client's storage, and the computational cost at the client's (or the server's) end. On the other hand, the client often prefers to delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor who performs audits on the client's data and informs the client in case of any anomaly detected in the server's behavior.
Shi et al. [9] propose two efficient dynamic POR schemes: one with private verifiability and another with public verifiability. In this work, we provide a construction of a publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme that is more efficient (in terms of write and audit costs) than the publicly verifiable scheme proposed by Shi et al. [9] . Moreover, the public parameters used in the latter scheme need to be changed for each write operation performed on the client's data which is clearly an overhead as, in that case, these public parameters are to be validated and certified for every write.
Our Contribution. We summarize our contributions in this paper as follows.
We construct a dynamic proofs-of-retrievability scheme where the client outsources her data file to the cloud server and she can update the content of the file later. Our construction is based on the homomorphic hashing technique. Our dynamic POR scheme offers public verifiability, that is, the client can delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor who performs audits on the client's behalf. We show that our scheme is secure in the sense that the client gets an assurance that her data file stored by the server is authentic and up-to-date, and all the data blocks can be retrieved by the client as often as needed.
We analyze the performance of our scheme and compare it with other existing dynamic POR schemes (having private or public verifiability). Our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme enjoys more efficiency (in terms of communication bandwidths required for a write and an audit) than the "state-of-the-art" publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme [9] . Moreover, unlike the latter scheme, there is no need to validate or certify the public parameters in our scheme for every write operation as they are fixed since the initial setup phase. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the preliminaries and background related to our work. In Section 3, we survey the existing literature on secure cloud storage schemes. Section 4 provides a detailed construction of our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme. We analyze the security of our scheme in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the performance of our scheme and compare our scheme with other existing dynamic POR schemes based on different parameters (shown in Table 1 ). We also show that our scheme is more efficient than the publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme proposed by Shi et al. [9] . In the concluding Section 7, we summarize the work done in this paper.
PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
Notation
We take to be the security parameter. An algorithm denoted by Að1 Þ is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm when its running time is polynomial in and its output y is a random variable which depends on the internal coin tosses of A. If A is given access to an oracle O, we denote A by A O also. An element a chosen uniformly at random from a set S is denoted as a R S. A function f : N ! R is called negligible in if for all positive integers c and for all sufficiently large , we have fðÞ < 1 c .
Erasure Code
An ðm;ñ; dÞ S -erasure code [10] , [11] is an error-correcting code [12] that comprises an encoding algorithm Enc: Sñ ! Sm (encodes a message consisting ofñ symbols into a longer codeword consisting ofm symbols) and a decoding algorithm Dec: Sm ! Sñ (decodes a codeword to a message), where S is a finite alphabet and d is the minimum distance (Hamming distance between any two codewords is at least d) of the code. The quantityñ m is called the rate of the code. A ðm;ñ; dÞ S -erasure code can tolerate up to d À 1 erasures. If d ¼m Àñ þ 1, we call the code an ðm;ñÞ-maximum distance separable (MDS) code when S is understood from the context. For an MDS code, the original message can be reconstructed from anyñ out ofm symbols of the codeword. Reed-Solomon codes [13] and their extensions are examples of non-trivial MDS codes.
Merkle Hash Tree
A Merkle hash tree [14] is a binary tree where each leafnode stores a data item. The label of each leaf-node is the data item stored in the node itself. A collision-resistant hash function h CR is used to label the intermediate nodes of the tree. Each of the outputs of h CR on different inputs is a binary string of length OðÞ. The label of a intermediate node v is the output of h CR computed on the labels of the children nodes of v. A Merkle hash tree is used as a standard tool for efficient memory-checking. Fig. 1 shows a Merkle hash tree containing the data items fd 1 ; d 2 ; . . . ; d 8 g stored at the leaf-nodes. Consequently, the labels of the intermediate nodes are computed using the hash function h CR . The hash value of the node A is the root-digest. The proof showing that a data item d is present in the tree consists of the data item d and the labels of the nodes along the associated path (the sequence of siblings of the node containing the data item d). For example, a proof showing that d 3 is present in the tree consists of fd 3 ; ðd 4 ; l D ; l C Þg, where d 4 ; l D and l C are the labels of the nodes K; D and C, respectively. Given such a proof, a verifier computes the hash value of the root. The verifier outputs accept if the computed hash value matches with the root-digest; it outputs reject, otherwise. The size of a proof is logarithmic in the number of data items stored in the leaf-nodes of the tree.
Due to the collision-resistance property of h CR , it is infeasible (except with some probability negligible in the security parameter ) to add or modify a data item in the Merkle hash tree without changing its root-digest.
Digital Signature Scheme
Diffie and Hellman introduce the public-key cryptography and the notion of digital signatures in their seminal paper "New Directions in Cryptography" [15] . Rivest et al. propose the first digital signature scheme based on the RSA assumption [16] . Boneh et al. [17] introduce the first signature scheme where the signatures are short (e.g., such a signature of size 160 bits provides the security comparable to that of a 1024-bit RSA signature). The DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) [18] and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) [19] signature schemes (variants of the ElGamal signature scheme [20] ) are widely used in practice.
A digital signature scheme consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms: a key generation algorithm KeyGen, a signing algorithm Sign and a verification algorithm Verify. KeyGen takes as input the security parameter and outputs a pair of keys ðpsk; sskÞ, where ssk is the secret key and psk is the corresponding public verification key. Algorithm Sign takes a message m from the message space M and the secret key ssk as input and outputs a signature s. Algorithm Verify takes as input the public key psk, a message m and a signature s, and outputs accept or reject depending upon whether the signature is valid or not. Any of these algorithms can be probabilistic in nature. The correctness and security (existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks [21] ) of a digital signature scheme are described as follows.
(1) Correctness: Algorithm Verify always accepts a signature generated by an honest signer, that is, 
Discrete Logarithm Assumption
The discrete logarithm problem [22] , [23] over a multiplicative group G q ¼ hgi of prime order q and generated by g is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given y 2 G q , the discrete logarithm problem over G q is to compute x 2 Z q such that y ¼ g x .
The discrete logarithm assumption over G q says that, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary Að1 Þ, the probability Pr
is negligible in , where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of A and the random choice of x.
Dynamic Proofs of Retrievability
We define a proofs-of-retrievability scheme for dynamic data as follows [9] , [24] .
Definition 2 (Dynamic PoR).
A dynamic POR scheme consists of the following protocols between two stateful parties: a client (data owner) and a server.
Init(1 ; n; b; F ): This protocol associates a random fileidentifier fid to the data file F consisting of n data blocks each of b bits, and it outputs the client state state C and another file F 0 to be stored by the server. A dynamic POR scheme is privately verifiable if only the client with some secret information can perform an audit, that is, state C is secret. Otherwise, it is publicly verifiable. For a publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme, a third party auditor can audit the client's data on behalf of the client who delegates her auditing task to the TPA. In this case, we use the term "verifier" to denote an auditor who can be the TPA or the client herself. Fig. 2 shows the entities involved in a dynamic POR scheme. Security of a dynamic POR scheme is described in Section 5.
Homomorphic Hash Function
A homomorphic hash function h : F m ! G q (for a finite field F and a multiplicative group G q of prime order q) is defined as a collision-resistant hash function satisfying the following two properties: 1) for vectors u; v 2 F m and scalars a; b 2 F, it holds that hðau þ bvÞ ¼ hðuÞ a Á hðvÞ b , and 2) it is computationally hard to find vectors u; v 2 F m (u 6 ¼ v) such that hðuÞ ¼ hðvÞ.
Krohn et al. [25] construct a homomorphic hash function in the context of content distribution. The construction is similar to that proposed in incremental hashing schemes [26] . Let G q be a multiplicative group of prime order q. Let m elements (generators) g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g m be selected randomly from G q . Then, the homomorphic hash of a vector u ¼ ½u 1 ; u 2 ; . . . ; u m 2 Z m q is defined as hðuÞ ¼ Q m i¼1 g i u i . The hash function thus constructed is homomorphic, and the collision-resistance property is derived from the discrete logarithm assumption over G q . We use this construction in our dynamic POR scheme to generate authentication tags for data blocks (see Section 4.2.1).
RELATED WORK
Ateniese et al. [1] introduce the notion of provable data possession. In a PDP scheme, the client computes an authentication tag (e.g., message authentication code [27] ) for each block of her data file and uploads the file along with the authentication tags. During an audit protocol, the client samples a predefined number of random block-indices and sends them to the server (challenge phase). The cardinality of the challenge set is typically taken to be OðÞ, where is the security parameter. Depending upon the challenge, the server does some computations over the stored data and sends a proof to the client (response phase). Finally, the client checks the integrity of her data based on this proof (verification phase). Almost all data blocks can be retrieved from a (possibly malicious) server passing an audit with a non-negligible probability. Other PDP schemes include [2] , [3] , [4] , [28] , [29] .
Juels and Kaliski [7] introduce proofs of retrievability for static data (Naor and Rothblum [30] give a similar idea for sublinear authenticators). According to Shacham and Waters [8] , the retrievability guarantee for all data blocks of the outsourced file can be achieved by encoding the original file with an erasure code (see Section 2.2) before authenticating (and uploading) the blocks of the encoded file. Due to the redundancy added to the data blocks, the server has to delete or modify a considerable number of blocks to actually delete or modify a data block which makes it difficult for the server to pass an audit.
Following the work by Juels and Kaliski, several POR schemes have been proposed for static data (static POR) and dynamic data (dynamic POR). Shacham and Waters [8] propose two POR schemes for static data (one with private verifiability and another with public verifiability) where the response from the server is short. Bowers et al. [31] propose a theoretical framework for designing POR schemes and provide a prototype implementation of a variant of [7] . In another work, Bowers et al. [32] introduce HAIL (HighAvailability and Integrity Layer), a distributed POR setting where the client's data are disseminated across multiple servers. Dodis et al. [33] introduce a notion called "POR codes" and show how POR schemes can be instantiated based on these POR codes. They explore the connection between POR codes and the notion of hardness amplification [34] . Xu and Chang [35] improve the privately verifiable scheme of [8] by making the communication bandwidth required for an audit to be OðÞ. Armknecht et al. [36] propose a POR scheme where any entity among the client (data owner), the auditor and the cloud server can be malicious, and any two of them can collude as well. The auditor performs two audits: one for the auditor itself and another on behalf of the client. The challenge sets are generated using a public randomized algorithm derived from the hash value of the latest block added to the Bitcoin block chain [37] .
A few dynamic POR schemes are there in the literature. Stefanov et al. [38] propose an authenticated file system called "Iris" that is highly scalable and resilient against a malicious cloud server. Cash et al. [24] encode a small number of data blocks locally and hide the access pattern of the related (belonging to the same codeword) blocks from the server using oblivious RAM (ORAM) [39] . Due to the use of expensive ORAM primitives, this scheme is inefficient. Shi et al. [9] propose two practical dynamic POR schemes which reduce the cost of computation as well as the communication bandwidth required to execute the protocols involved. Chandran et al. [40] introduce the notion of Fig. 2 . The entities involved in a dynamic POR scheme. The client (data owner) processes the data file F to form another file F 0 and outsources it to the cloud storage server. She can later read or write the outsourced data. For a privately verifiable scheme, the client performs audits on her data. For a publicly verifiable scheme, she can delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor who performs audits on behalf of the client.
"locally updatable and locally decodable codes" and propose an efficient dynamic POR scheme by applying the techniques used in the construction of such a code. Ren et al. [41] propose a dynamic POR scheme for multiple storage servers where the data file is split into data blocks and each of these data blocks is encoded using intra-server (erasure coding) and inter-server (network coding) redundancy. An update in a block requires changing only a few codeword symbols. Moreover, the inter-server redundancy achieved using network coding reduces the repair bandwidth required in case any of the servers fails. The POR scheme by Guan et al. [42] exploits the privately verifiable scheme of [8] and gives a publicly verifiable scheme with the help of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [43] , [44] .
DYNAMIC POR SCHEME WITH PUBLIC VERIFIABILITY
In this section, we describe our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme with efficient writes and audits. Like the existing dynamic POR schemes [9] , [24] , our construction also rely on the hierarchical structure provided by the oblivious RAM [39] . Specifically, we follow a storage structure similar to the one proposed by Shi et al. [9] . However, our construction is more efficient than their scheme in terms of the cost of a write operation and the cost of an audit. Our construction is based on collision-resistant homomorphic hashing technique [25] , [26] along with a digital signature scheme. To the best of our knowledge, the homomorphic hashing technique has not been used before in the context of POR schemes.
Storage Structure for Data Blocks
Our scheme relies on a storage structure similar to that proposed by Shi et al. [9] . Let the client (data owner) associate a random file-identifier fid of bit-size to the data file she wants to outsource to the cloud server. We assume that the data file is divided into blocks of size b bits, and read (and write) operations are performed on these blocks. The value of b is taken to be logp b c for a large primep. The way this primep is selected is discussed in Section 4.1.2. For static data, a standard way to guarantee retrievability of the file is to encode the file using an erasure code [8] . The main drawback of using erasure codes in dynamic POR is that an update in a single block in a codeword (say, C) is followed by updates on other OðnÞ blocks in C, where n is the number of blocks being encoded to form C. The underlying idea to overcome this drawback is not to update the encoded copy (C) for every write operation (insertion, deletion or modification). Instead, it is updated (or rebuilt) only when sufficient updates are done on the data file. Thus, the amortized cost for writes is reduced dramatically. However, this encoded copy stores stale data between two such rebuilds. Therefore, a hierarchical log structure is maintained which temporarily stores values for the intermediate writes between two successive rebuilds of C. Each level of this hierarchical log is also encoded using an erasure code.
We adopt the storage structure and code construction mentioned above in our scheme. However, we use collision-resistant homomorphic hashing to construct another hierarchical storage (discussed in Section 4.2) in order to reduce the cost of a write and an audit for the client.
Our scheme involves the following three data structures in order to store the data blocks of the client's file:
an unencoded buffer U containing all the up-to-date data blocks of the file (that is, U is updated after every write operation is performed), an encoded buffer C which is updated after every n writes (that is, C is rebuilt afresh by encoding the latest U after every n write operations), and an encoded hierarchical (multiple levels of buffers) log structure H which accommodates all intermediate writes between two successive rebuilds of C (H is made empty after every n writes). We note that all of these data structures are stored on the cloud server. The server also stores two additional data structures,H andC (similar to H and C, respectively), for authentication tags described in Section 4.2.
Structure of Buffer U
The buffer U contains an up-to-date copy of the data file. Reads and writes are performed directly on the required locations of U. A Merkle hash tree is maintained over the data blocks of U to check the authenticity of the read block (see Section 2.3 for the description of a Merkle hash tree). The Merkle proof sent by the server along with the read block is verified with respect to the up-todate root-digest (say, digMHT ) of the Merkle hash tree. One can also use other authenticated data structures like rank-based authenticated skip lists [2] instead of a Merkle hash tree. Let n be the number of blocks the client outsources to the cloud server initially. So the height of the Merkle tree built on U is log n d e. Read and write operations on the buffer U are described in details in Section 4.3.
Structure of Hierarchical Log H
A hierarchical log structure H is maintained that consists of ðk þ 1Þ levels H 0 ; H 1 ; . . . ; H k , where k ¼ log n b c. The log structure H stores the intermediate writes temporarily. For each 0 4 l 4 k, the lth level H l ¼ ðX l ; Y l Þ consists of an encoded copy of 2 l data blocks using a ð2 lþ1 ; 2 l Þ-MDS (maximum distance separable) erasure code, where X l and Y l contain 2 l blocks each. The original data blocks encoded in H l arrive at time t; t þ 1; . . . ; t þ 2 l À 1 ðmod nÞ, where t is a multiple of 2 l . We describe the encoding procedure as follows.
Letp be a large prime such thatp ¼ a Á ð2nÞ þ 1 for some a 2 N and the bit-size of a block b ¼ logp b c, where b ) . Letg denote a generator of Z Ã p . Then, v ¼g a modp is a 2nth primitive root of unity modulop. When a block B is written to H, it is inserted in the topmost level (l ¼ 0) if H 0 is empty. That is, X 0 is set to B. In addition, Y 0 is set to B Á v cðtÞ for the tth ( mod n) write, where v is the 2nth primitive root of unity modulop. Here, cðÁÞ is the bit reversal function, where cðtÞ is the value of the binary string obtained by reversing the binary representation of t.
If the top i levels H 0 ; H 1 ; . . . ; H iÀ1 are already full, a rebuild is performed to accommodate all the blocks in these levels as well as the new block in H i (and to make all the levels up to H iÀ1 empty). Shi et al. [9] employ a fast incrementally constructible code based on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [45] , [46] . 1 Fig. 3 describes the algorithm for rebuild of X l that in turn uses the algorithm mix shown in Fig. 4 . Although the algorithm deals with X l , the same algorithm can be used for rebuilding Y l if we replace the X arrays by corresponding Y arrays and the incoming block B by B Á v cðtÞ . We refer [9] for the form of the ð2 l Â 2 lþ1 Þ generator matrix G l for the lth level code. Letx l be the vector containing 2 l data blocks most recently inserted in H (after applying a permutation). Then, the output of the algorithm mix for H l is the same as that whenx l is multiplied by G l . Any ð2 l Â 2 l Þ submatrix of the generator matrix G l is full rank, and thus, the code achieves the maximum distance separable property.
As a concrete example, the rebuild of X 3 is demonstrated in Fig. 5 . The other part of H 3 (that is, Y 3 ) is rebuilt in a similar fashion. We observe that, by using this code, the rebuild cost of H l is Oðb Á 2 l Þ (i.e., linear in the length of H l ) since the algorithm mix populates H l by combining two arrays Figs. 4 and 5). The lth level is rebuilt after 2 l writes. Therefore, the amortized cost for rebuilding is Oðblog nÞ per write operation. Each rebuild of the buffer C (discussed in Section 4.1.3) is followed by making all levels of H empty.
Structure of Buffer C
Unlike the buffer U (and H), no read or write operations are performed directly on the buffer C. After n write operations, the buffer U is encoded using an erasure code to form a new copy of C, and the existing copy of C is replaced by this new one. The rebuild of C can be done using the same FFT-based code discussed in Section 4.1.2 which costs Oðb nlog nÞ both in time and bandwidth. As C is rebuilt after every n write operations, the cost incurred per write is Oðb log nÞ. We note that C contains stale data between two successive rebuilds. However, the intermediate writes are accommodated in H with appropriate encoding. Thus, these blocks written between two successive rebuilds of C are also retrievable at any point of time.
Storage Structure for Authentication Tags Corresponding to Data Blocks
We note that each data block in U, H and C is of size b ¼ logp b c bits for a large primep ¼ a Á ð2nÞ þ 1 for some a 2 N. Thus, the size of a data block b ) , where is the security parameter. For example, b is taken to be 64 KB and is taken to be 128 bits in our scheme (see Table 2 in Section 6.2). In addition to the log structure H and the buffer C, two similar structuresH andC for authentication tags corresponding to the blocks in H and C (respectively) are stored on the cloud server. Thus, the server stores U, H, C,H andC. The benefits of storingH andC on the server are as follows.
Let us assume that the authentication tags for data blocks have the following properties.
(1) The size of a tag is much less than that of a block.
(2) The tags are homomorphic in the sense that, given the tags of two blocks B 1 and B 2 , the tag on any linear combination of B 1 and B 2 can be generated. We note that the fundamental operation for a write (or rebuild) on H and C is to encode data blocks, that is, to compute a linear combination of those data blocks (see Equations. 1 and 2 in Fig. 4) . Due the second property mentioned above, while the server itself performs write operations on H and C, the client (data owner) can perform similar operations onH andC. On the other hand, due to the first property, the bandwidth required between the client and the server for a write operation decreases significantly as the client now has to download much smaller tags instead of large data blocks. The cost of storage is less nowadays, whereas bandwidth is more expensive and often limited. Therefore, it is reasonable if we trade the storage off to reduce the communication bandwidth between the client and the server required for a write (or rebuild).
Indeed, the authentication tags (described in the following section) we use in our dynamic POR scheme satisfy the following properties.
The size of a tag is OðÞ and is independent of the size of a data block b, where ( b. The homomorphic property is achieved by using a collision-resistant homomorphic hash function. Apart from efficient write operations, the cost of an audit in our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme is comparable to that in the privately verifiable scheme of [9] , and it is much less than that in the publicly verifiable scheme discussed in the same work.
Generation of Authentication Tags
Setup. For the data file identified by fid, the client runs an algorithm Setup(1 ) to set parameters for generating authentication tags. The algorithm Setup selects two 1. We can use any linear-time encodable and decodable errorcorrecting code [47] instead of the FFT-based code. However, as we compare the performance of our scheme with that of the "state-of-the-art" publicly verifiable scheme of [9] in Section 6, we use similar code and parameters for the ease of comparison.
random 
Using the signature scheme S, the client generates the final authentication tag for the block B as hðBÞ ¼ ðhðBÞ; Sign ssk ðhðBÞ; fid; addr; tÞÞ;
where addr is the physical address B is written to (at time t) and fid is the file-identifier of the data file the block B belongs to.
Collision-resistance and Homomorphic Properties. As shown in [25] , [26] , given that the discrete logarithm assumption (see Section 2.5) holds in G q , it is computationally hard to find two blocks B 1 and B 2 such that B 1 6 ¼ B 2 and hðB 1 Þ ¼ hðB 2 Þ (collision-resistance property).
On the other hand, given B 
(homomorphic property).
Size of a Tag. The size of an authentication taghðBÞ is the sum of jhðBÞj (which is p ¼ OðÞ bits) and the size of a signature in S. If we use the standard ECDSA signature scheme [19] as S, then a signature is 4 bits long.
2 Thus, jhðBÞj is also OðÞ bits. For the values of different parameters considered in our scheme (see Table 2 in Section 6.2), the size of a tag is only 192 bytes which is very small compared to the size of a block (64 KB).
Improvement in Cost of Tag Computation. To compute the homomorphic hash hðBÞ on a block B using Equation. (3), it requires m exponentiations and ðm À 1Þ multiplications modulo p. We can reduce this computational complexity in the following way at the cost of the client storing m elements of Z Ã q which is essentially equivalent to just one block. The client chooses g R G q and g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g m R Z Ã q . The client sets g i ¼ g g i mod p for each i 2 ½1; m. The client includes the vector G ¼ ½g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g m and g in her secret key SK and makes g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g m public as before. Now, the homomorphic hash hðBÞ on a block B is computed as
which requires only one exponentiation modulo p along with m multiplications and ðm À 1Þ additions modulo q. This is a huge improvement in the cost for computing an authentication tag. On the other hand, the storage overhead at the client's side is jGj which is same as the size of a single block B. Considering the fact that the client outsources millions of blocks to the cloud server, this amount of client storage is reasonable for all practical purposes.
Storage Structure forH andC
The storage structures forH andC are exactly the same as those for H and C, respectively, except that the authentication 2. To reduce the size of a tag, we can use short signatures of size 2 bits [17] . However, the verification of a signature is more expensive due to computation of bilinear pairings [48] .
tags (instead of data blocks) are stored inH andC (see Section 4.1 for structures of H and C).
Operations
There are three types of operations involved in a dynamic POR scheme. The client can read, write and audit her data stored on the cloud server. The read and write operations are authenticated in that the client can verify the authenticity of these operations. We note that though the client herself performs reads and writes on her data, she can delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor for a publicly verifiable scheme. As our scheme is publicly verifiable, we use the term verifier to denote an auditor who can be a TPA or the client herself. Fig. 6 gives an overview of the communication flow between the client and the server during these operations.
Read
Reads are performed directly from the unencoded buffer U. The authenticity and freshness of the block read can be guaranteed by using a Merkle hash tree [14] (or a similar data structure like rank-based authenticated skip list [2] ) over the blocks of U. That is, the blocks of U constitute the leaf-nodes of the Merkle hash tree (see Section 2.3 for a brief description of a Merkle hash tree). The server sends the Merkle proof P read containing the requested block and the labels of the nodes along the associated path of the tree to the client. The client maintains the up-to-date value of the root-digest of the Merkle hash tree digMHT and verifies the proof P read with respect to this root-digest. We note that the size of the root-digest of the Merkle hash tree is OðÞ bits.
Write
Let updtype denote the type of a write operation which can be insertion of a new block after the ith block, deletion of the ith block or modification of the ith block. A write operation affects the buffers in the following way.
Write on U. As the buffer U is unencoded, a write operation on U can be performed in a similar way as done on the data blocks in a dynamic provable data possession scheme [2] . We briefly describe the procedure as follows.
Let digMHT be the root-digest of the current Merkle hash tree which is stored at the client's side. The client performs an authenticated read on the ith data block of U (as described above). If the associated Merkle proof P read does not match with digMHT , the client aborts. Otherwise, she computes, from P read , the value that would be the new root-digest (say, digMHT new ) if the write operation is correctly performed on U stored at the server. The client stores digMHT new temporarily at her end and asks the server to perform the write on U. The server performs this write operation on U, computes the root-digest digMHT server of the Merkle hash tree and sends digMHT server to the client. The client verifies whether
If they are not equal, the client aborts. Otherwise, the client sets digMHT ¼ digMHT new at her end.
Write on H andH. We assume that deletion of a block in U corresponds to insertion of a block (with null content) in the hierarchical log H. Therefore, for a write of any updtype (i.e., insertion, deletion or modification), only insertions take place in H. The way a (possibly encoded) block B is inserted in H is discussed in details in Section 4.1.2. The cloud server itself performs this operation on H. An insertion inH is performed by the client herself as this procedure requires the knowledge of secret information held by the client. The client computes the authentication tag on the (possibly encoded) block and insert it inH. The underlying basic operation of the rebuild phase of H is to compute a linear combination B (e.g., a 1 B 1 þ a 2 B 2 Þ of two blocks B 1 and B 2 (see Equations. 1 and 2 in Fig. 4) . Similarly, the corresponding operation for the rebuild ofH is to compute Fig. 6 . Communication flow between the client and the server for different operations described in Section 4.3. In the setup phase, the client sets parameters for the scheme and outsources the preprocessed file to the server. Initially, the client uploads U, C andC. The server stores them along with H andH that are initialized to be empty. Then, the client can perform reads, writes and audits on her data in an interleaved fashion. We note that, during a write, the server itself rebuilds H and C (if necessary). On the other hand, the client rebuildsH andC by downloading some of the authentication tags from them, computing the tag on the new block (using homomorphic property of tags) and sending the new tag to the server. As our scheme is publicly verifiable, audits can be performed by a third party auditor as well.
h ðBÞ givenhðB 1 Þ andhðB 2 Þ. For i ¼ 1; 2, the client first downloadshðB i Þ and verifies the signature on hðB i Þ by checking whether Verifyðpsk; ðhðB i Þ; fid; addr i ; t i Þ;hðB i ÞÞ ¼ ? accept;
where psk is the verification key for the signature scheme S. We note that addr 1 (or addr 2 ) is the physical address of the block B 1 (or B 2 ) written at time t 1 (or t 2 ), and fid is the file-identifier of the data file the block B belongs to. For any block in H and C, the time when the block was written most recently can be easily computed from the current time itself. If the verification passes, the client computes hðBÞ ¼ hðB 1 Þ a 1 Á hðB 2 Þ a 2 andhðBÞ subsequently. This requires two exponentiations and one multiplication modulo p along with one Sign and two Verify operations. Write on C andC. As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, C (C for authentication tags) is rebuilt after every n writes. The server performs a rebuild on C, whereas a rebuild onC is performed by the client. Basic operations involved in rebuilds of C andC are the same as those for rebuilds of H andH, respectively, and thus are omitted here.
Audit
In the challenge phase, the verifier chooses r ¼ Oðlog nÞ random locations faddr i g 14i4r from all levels (where OðÞ random locations are selected from each level) of H and C. Then, she sends a challenge set Q ¼ fðn i ; addr i Þg 14i4r to the cloud server, where n 1 ; n 2 ; . . . ; n r R Z Ã q are random coefficients. In the response phase, the server sends to the verifier a proof containing B Ã ¼ P 14i4r n i B addr i and fhðB addr i Þg 14i4r . Upon receiving the proof from the server, the verifier verifies each of the signatures on fhðB addr i Þg 14i4r . Then, she computes h Ã ¼ Q 14i4r hðB addr i Þ n i and hðB Ã Þ using Equation. (3). Finally, the verifier checks whether
and outputs 0 if any of the verifications fails; she outputs 1, otherwise.
SECURITY
We define security of a dynamic POR scheme [9] , [24] and show that our scheme described in Section 4 is secure according to this definition. We also show that the server cannot pass an audit without storing all data blocks properly, except with some probability negligible in .
Overview of Security of a Dynamic POR Scheme
A dynamic POR scheme must satisfy the following properties [9] . The formal security definition is given in Section 5.2.
(1) Authenticity and Freshness. The authenticity property requires that the cloud server cannot produce valid proofs during audits without storing the corresponding blocks and their respective authentication information untampered, except with a probability negligible in .
For dynamic data, the client can modify an existing data block. However, a malicious cloud server may discard this change and keep an old copy of the block. As the old copy of the block and its corresponding tag constitute a valid pair, the client has no way to detect if the cloud server is storing the fresh (latest) copy. Thus, the client must be convinced that the server has stored the up-to-date blocks. (2) Retrievability. Retrievability of data requires that, given a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that can respond correctly to a challenge Q with some non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract alldata blocks of the file (except with negligible probability) by challenging A for a polynomial (in ) number of times and verifying the responses sent by A.
The algorithm E has a black-box rewinding access to A. Authenticity and freshness of data restrict the adversary A to produce valid responses (without storing the data in an authentic and up-to-date fashion) during these interactions only with some probability negligible in .
Security Model
We first describe the following security game between the challenger (acting as the client) and the adversary (acting as the cloud server).
The adversary selects a file F associated with a fileidentifier fid to store. The challenger processes the file to form another file F 0 and returns F 0 to the adversary. The challenger stores only some metadata for verification purpose. The adversary adaptively chooses a sequence of operations defined by fop i g 14i4q 1 (q 1 is polynomial in the security parameter ), where op i is a read, a write or an audit. The challenger executes these operations on the file stored by the adversary. For each operation, the challenger verifies the response sent by the adversary and updates the metadata at her end only if the response passes the verification. Let F Ã be the final state of the file after q 1 operations. The challenger has the latest metadata for the file F Ã . Now, she executes an audit protocol with the adversary. The challenger sends a random challenge set Q to the adversary, and the adversary returns a cryptographic proof to the challenger. The adversary wins the game if it passes the verification.
Definition 3 (Security of a Dynamic POR Scheme). A dynamic POR scheme is secure if, given any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can win the security game mentioned above with some non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract all data blocks of the file by interacting (via challenge-response) with A polynomially many times.
Security Analysis of Our Scheme
We state and prove the following theorem in order to analyze the security of our dynamic POR scheme. Theorem 1. Given that the discrete logarithm assumption holds in G q and the underlying digital signature scheme is secure, the dynamic POR scheme described in Section 4 is secure according to Definition 3.
Proof. We use the following claim in order to prove Theorem 1. Claim 1. Given that the discrete logarithm assumption holds in G q and the underlying digital signature scheme is secure, authenticity and freshness of the challenged blocks in H and C are guaranteed.
Proof. We prove the above claim for the log structure H.
The proof for C follows in a similar way. In our scheme, every block B in H corresponds to an authentication taghðBÞ ¼ ðhðBÞ; Sign ssk ðhðBÞ; fid; addr; tÞÞ present inH, where the signing algorithm Sign uses the secret key ssk of the client and t is the last write-time of the block B. Let the block B (residing at addr and written at time t) be challenged during an audit. As the adversary A does not have the knowledge of ssk, it cannot generate a valid authentication taghðB 0 Þ for an arbitrary block B 0 of its choice (for the same fid; addr; t). Thus, the only possibility for A to break the authenticity guarantee is to find a block B 0 6 ¼ B such that hðB 0 Þ ¼ hðBÞ. However, given that the discrete logarithm assumption holds in G q , the homomorphic hashing scheme we use is collision-resistant (we refer [25] , [26] for the detailed proof showing that the collision-resistance property holds).
The idea of the proof is as follows. Let the adversary A, given the description of the multiplicative group G q ¼ hgi and m random elements g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g m of G q , be able to find two blocks B; B 0 2 Z m q such that B 6 ¼ B 0 and hðBÞ ¼ hðB 0 Þ. Then, we can construct another probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B that, given the description of G q and y 2 G q , executes A as a subroutine to find a collision and uses this collision to compute x 2 Z q such that y ¼ g x . In order to do that, B selects z 1 ; z 2 ; . . . ; z m R f0; 1g and u 1 ; u 2 ; . . . ; u m R Z q . For each i 2 ½1; m, B sets 
Þ mod q is the discrete logarithm of y in G q . This contradicts the discrete logarithm assumption over G q . Therefore, it is computationally hard to find two such blocks B and B 0 , and this implies that the authenticity property is preserved in our scheme.
We note that the last write-time t of a block B is computable from the current time. As the adversary A does not have the knowledge of ssk, it cannot generate a valid authentication taghðB 0 Þ corresponding to an old block B 0 (that was residing at the same physical address addr previously) for the last write-time t. In other words, suppose that the adversary A is given a message M 0 ¼ ðhðB 0 Þ; fid; addr; t 0 Þ and its corresponding signature Sign ssk ðM 0 Þ, Now, if A can produce a valid signature on another message M ¼ ðhðB 0 Þ; fid; addr; tÞ for t 0 6 ¼ t (thus M 0 6 ¼ M), it breaks the security of the signature scheme (see Section 2.4 for the security definition of a signature scheme). However, as the underlying signature scheme used in our scheme is assumed to be secure, A can forge such a signature only with a negligible probability. Thus, the adversary must store each of the challenged blocks with its latest content to pass the audit.
t u We define a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract all blocks from each of the levels of H and C (except with negligible probability) by interacting with an adversary A that wins the security game described in Section 5.2 with some non-negligible probability. As our dynamic POR scheme satisfies the authenticity and freshness properties mentioned above, the adversary A cannot produce a valid proof ðB Ã ¼ P 14i4r n i B addr i ; fhðB addr i Þg 14i4r Þ for a given challenge set Q ¼ fðn i ; addr i Þg 14i4r without storing the challenged blocks and their corresponding tags properly, except with some negligible probability (see Section 4.3.3 and Claim 1). This means that if the verification outputs 1 during the extraction phase, B Ã in the proof is indeed the linear combination of the untampered blocks fB addr i g 14i4r using coefficients fn i g 14i4r .
Suppose that the extractor E wants to extract r blocks indexed by J. It challenges A with Q ¼ fðn i ; addr i Þg i2J . If the proof is valid (that is, the verification outputs 1), E initializes a matrix M E as ½n 1i i2J , where n 1i ¼ n i for each i 2 J. The extractor challenges A for the same J but with different random coefficients. If the verification outputs 1 and the vector of coefficients is linearly independent to the existing rows of M E , then E appends this vector to M E as a row. The extractor E runs this procedure until the matrix M E has r linearly independent rows. So, the final form of the full-rank matrix M E is ½n ji j2½1;r;i2J . Consequently, the challenged blocks can be extracted using Gaussian elimination.
Following the way mentioned above, the extractor algorithm E can interact with A (polynomially many times) in order to extract r-fraction of blocks (for some r) for each level of H and C by setting the index set J appropriately. Use of a r-rate erasure code ensures retrievability of all blocks of C (i.e., all the encoded blocks of U up to the last rebuild of C) and H (i.e., all the encoded blocks of U written after the last rebuild of C). For each lth level of H (or C), the FFT-based code used in our scheme is a ð2 lþ1 ; 2 l Þ-MDS erasure code; thus, r ¼ 
Probabilistic Guarantees
As we mention in Section 4.3, each of the levels of H and the buffer C is audited with OðÞ random locations. Let us assume that random locations in each of these levels are checked by the verifier during an audit. For each level 0 4 l 4 log n b c, 2 l data blocks present in the lth level are encoded using a ð2 lþ1 ; 2 l Þ-MDS (maximum distance separable) erasure code to form 2 lþ1 blocks, where each of the 2 l parity blocks is computed as a linear combination of those 2 l data blocks (an MDS code is defined in Section 2.2). All of these 2 l data blocks can be retrieved from any 2 l (data or parity) blocks out of total 2 lþ1 blocks in the lth level (this holds due to the MDS property of the erasure code). Therefore, the server has to delete (or corrupt) at least 2 l blocks (out of total 2 lþ1 blocks in the lth level) in order to make even a single data block in the lth level irretrievable. Now, if the cloud server deletes (or corrupts) half of the blocks in the lth level, then it passes an audit with probability p cheat ¼ ð1 À 1 2 Þ ¼ 2 À (in this scenario, the server passes an audit if each of the random locations the verifier checks for integrity belongs to the other half that the server has not deleted). This probability p cheat is negligible in the security parameter (e.g., p cheat ¼ 1 2 128 in our scheme as is taken to be 128). So, the verifier detects this malicious behavior of the server during an audit, except with a negligible probability.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Asymptotic Analysis
We analyze the performance of the following types of operations (described in Section 4.3) involved in our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme.
Read. For an authenticated read on the data block B present in U, the server sends the corresponding Merkle proof P read which consists of the block B, the data block in the sibling leaf-node of B and the hash values along the associated path of the Merkle hash tree (see Section 2.3). Thus, a read operation takes 2b þ Oðlog nÞ communication bandwidth between the client and the server.
To reduce this cost, the client can generate authentication tags on the data blocks of U (as discussed in Section 4.2.1) and construct a Merkle tree over these tags instead of the data blocks. In this setting, P read consists ofhðBÞ, the authentication tag in its sibling leaf-node and the hash values along the associated path. This reduces the communication bandwidth between the client and the server for a read to b þ Oðlog nÞ. Write. A write operation incurs the following costs. -Write on U: A write operation on U involves an authenticated read operation followed by the verification of Equation. (5). Thus, each write operation requires b þ Oðlog nÞ bandwidth between the client and the server (for communicating P read and digMHT server ). -Write on H andH: The cost of a write on H is Oðblog nÞ (see Section 4.1.2). Similarly, the cost of a write onH is Oðlog nÞ as the blocks are replaced by their authentication tags inH and the size of a tag is OðÞ bits. -Write on C andC: C (orC) is rebuilt after every n writes. As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, a write operation on C costs Oðblog nÞ both in time and bandwidth. Similarly, the cost of a write onC is Oðlog nÞ. Audit. During an audit, for a challenge set Q containing r ¼ Oðlog nÞ random locations faddr i g 14i4r and random coefficients n 1 ; n 2 ; . . . ; n r 2 Z Ã q , the server computes a proof containing B Ã ¼ P 14i4r n i B addr i and fhðB addr i Þg 14i4r and sends the proof to the verifier. Thus, the bandwidth required for an audit is given by b þ Oð 2 log nÞ. Comparison among Dynamic POR Schemes. We compare our scheme with other existing dynamic POR schemes which is summarized in Table 1 . The comparison is based on the asymptotic complexity for different parameters. Some of the figures mentioned in Table 1 are taken from [9] .
From Table 1 , we note that, in our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme, bandwidths required for a write and an audit are given by b þ Oðlog nÞ and b þ Oð 2 log nÞ, respectively. These figures are asymptotically the same as those in the privately verifiable scheme of [9] . On the other hand, this is a significant improvement over the publicly verifiable scheme of [9] where bandwidths required for a write and an audit are bð1 þ Þ þ Oðlog nÞ and Oðblog nÞ, respectively, for a constant > 0 and b ) .
Additionally, one drawback of the publicly verifiable scheme proposed by Shi et al. [9] is due to the fact that one We take as the security parameter and n as the number of blocks (each b-bits long) of the data file to be outsourced to the server. For all of the schemes mentioned above, the storage on the server side is OðbnÞ, where b ) . The cost of an authenticated read operation is b þ Oðlog nÞ if a Merkle hash tree is maintained over the unencoded data blocks for checking authenticity and freshness. y is a constant such that > 0.
or more Merkle hash trees (separate from the Merkle hash tree 3 maintained for U) are maintained to ensure the integrity of the blocks in the hierarchical log H (one for the entire log or one for each of its levels). To enable a third party auditor to audit the data blocks residing at different levels of this log, the root-digests of these trees need to be made public. However, some of these root-digests are changed as often as new data blocks are inserted in the hierarchical log structure, thus resulting in a change in the public parameters for each write. This incurs an additional (non-trivial) overhead for validation and certification of the public parameters for every write operation. On the other hand, the public parameters in our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme are fixed throughout the execution of the protocols involved.
Apart from the schemes listed in Table 1 , we mention some POR schemes proposed recently that handle data dynamics as follows. The dynamic POR scheme proposed by Guan et al. [42] uses the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [43] , [44] to construct a publicly verifiable POR scheme from the privately verifiable scheme of Shacham and Waters [8] . It also handles dynamic data using a "modified B+ Merkle tree". However, the iO candidates available in the literature are not currently practical. Ren et al. [41] propose a dynamic POR scheme where the data file is encoded using erasure coding (intra-server encoding) and network coding (inter-server encoding). The encoded blocks are then disseminated among multiple storage servers. Use of network coding reduces the communication bandwidth required for a repair in case of a node (server) failure. For the intra-server encoding, each block is divided into some sub-blocks (using an erasure code), and a "rangebased 2-3 tree" (rb23Tree) is built upon these sub-blocks for each server. This ensures the authenticity and freshness properties of the blocks within a server. We note that each block is encoded (locally) into a few number of sub-blocks for the intra-server encoding. Therefore, an update in a block (or in any of its sub-blocks) requires updating only a few sub-blocks corresponding to that block. This makes an update in this scheme efficient. On the other hand, a malicious server needs to delete only a few sub-blocks to actually make a block unavailable. Thus, the dynamic POR scheme proposed by Ren et al. [41] differs from our scheme on the basis of the granularity of data the client needs.
Performance Evaluation
For performance evaluation of our dynamic POR scheme, we exploit some benchmarks to estimate times required by the client (or the verifier) to carry out different operations in different phases. All of the timing measures (reported in milliseconds) are estimated for a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5-3210M processor. Table 2 mentions typical values of the parameters used in our scheme [25] .
The hash function h CR used in the Merkle hash tree (built on the blocks of U) is realized as SHA-256. We estimate the time taken to compute SHA-256 from eBASH, a benchmarking project for hash functions [49] . The computation of SHA-256 on a message of length 64 bytes takes around 7:67 Â 10 À4 milliseconds on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5-3210M processor.
A multi-exponentiation in the multiplicative group G q (of prime order q) computes m exponentiations followed by m À 1 multiplications in G q in a more efficient manner than the naive approach. For the timing analysis of this operation, we use PandA, a software framework developed by Chuengsatiansup et al. [50] . The time required for a multi-exponentiation in G q for m ¼ 128 is around 16.33 milliseconds on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5-3210M processor.
We use eBATS, a benchmarking project for asymmetric systems [51] , to estimate the times required for operations related to ECDSA signatures using the standard NIST B-283 elliptic curve. The times required for generating the pair of keys ðpsk; sskÞ, signing a message and verifying a signature are at most 0.84 milliseconds, 0.89 milliseconds and 1.73 milliseconds, respectively, on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5-3210M processor. We note that each of the last two operations initially invokes SHA-256 to hash the input message.
Generation of an Authentication Tag. As described in Section 4.2.1, in order to generate an authentication taghðBÞ on a block B, the client has to compute a multi-exponentiation in G q to obtain hðBÞ (see Equation. (3)), and then she has to generate a signature on ðhðBÞ; fid; addr; tÞ. Therefore, the total time taken to compute an authentication tag for a block is 17.22 milliseconds. We note that this computation can be made more efficient with the help of only one exponentiation in G q along with m multiplications and ðm À 1Þ additions in Z q (see Equation. (4)).
Cost of Verification. The client (or the verifier) needs to verify proofs (provided by the cloud server) during different operations as stated below.
Validation Cost for a Merkle Proof: During an authenticated read (or an authenticated write) on the buffer U, the cloud server sends to the client a Merkle proof consisting of the labels of the nodes of the Merkle hash tree along the associated path corresponding to the particular block requested. The client checks the validity of the proof with respect to the root-digest dig MHT . This verification requires log n d einvocations of the collision-resistant hash function h CR . As the hash function h CR used in the Merkle hash tree for U is realized as SHA-256, this verification takes around 7:67 Â 10 À4 Â log n d emilliseconds on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5-3210M processor. As a concrete example, for 3 . We note that, in our scheme as well as in [9] , a Merkle hash tree is maintained for the unencoded buffer U. However, as U is not audited (its authenticity is checked only by the client during a read or write) by a third party auditor, the client keeps the root-digest of this Merkle hash tree (for U) private avoiding frequent updates in the public parameters.
a data file of size 16 GB and each block being of size 64 KB, the time required to verify the Merkle proof is around 0.014 milliseconds. Validation Cost for an Audit: During an audit, for each level of H (or C), the verifier chooses random locations faddr i g 14i4 . The cloud server sends a proof containing B Ã ¼ P 14i4 n i B addr i and fhðB addr i Þg 14i4 . Upon receiving the proof from the server, the verifier verifies each of the signatures on fhðB addr i Þg 14i4 . Then, the verifier computes h Ã ¼ Q 14i4 hðB addr i Þ n i and hðB Ã Þ (using Equation. (3)). Thus, the verifier needs to perform number of signature verifications, one multi-exponentiation in G q to compute h Ã and one multi-exponentiation in G q to compute hðB Ã Þ. This requires around 128 Â 0:89 þ 2 Â 16:33 % 146:58 milliseconds on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5-3210M processor. Therefore, for all k þ 1 (where k ¼ log n b c) levels of H (or C), the time required to verify a proof during an audit is at most 146:58 Â ðk þ 1Þ milliseconds. For instance, for a data file of size 16 GB and each block being of size 64 KB, the verification during an audit takes at most 2.79 seconds. 2) to form H lþ1 ¼ ðX lþ1 ;Ỹ lþ1 Þ. In Section 4.2.1, we have seen that, given two blocks B 1 and B 2 , the homomorphic hash on another block B ¼ a 1 B 1 þ a 2 B 2 can be computed as hðBÞ ¼ hðB 1 Þ a 1 Á hðB 2 Þ a 2 . So, for each of the 2 l iterations involved in mix for X lþ1 , the client needs to perform one exponentiation, one inverse and two multiplication operations in G q corresponding to Equations. 1 and 2 in Fig. 4 (along with verifying the signatures on two input hashes and computing signatures on the newly computed two hashes). However, we note that the rebuild of the ðl þ 1Þth level takes place after every 2 lþ1 writes. So, the amortized cost (which is thus independent of 2 l iterations) of rebuildingX lþ1 is half of the cost for one iteration in mix (that is, half of the total cost for performing one exponentiation, one inverse, two multiplications, two signature verifications and two signing operations). On a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5-3210M processor, this requires around 2.85 milliseconds (we estimate the costs of exponentiation, inverse and multiplication operations from PandA [50] ). Therefore, the amortized cost of rebuildingH lþ1 ¼ ðX lþ1 ;Ỹ lþ1 Þ is around 5.7 milliseconds.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a dynamic POR scheme where the client can update her data file after the initial outsourcing of the file to the cloud server and retrieve all of her data at any point of time. Our scheme is publicly verifiable, that is, anyone having the knowledge of the public parameters of the scheme can perform an audit on the client's behalf, and it offers security guarantees of a dynamic POR scheme. This scheme is more efficient (in terms of the cost of a write or an audit) than other practical and publicly verifiable dynamic POR schemes with a similar data granularity.
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